This article investigates the Commission's external energy policy through the lens of the regulatory state. It argues that because of the nature of its institutions, policy tools and resources, the Commission remains a liberal actor even as the world leaves the benign promarket environment of the 1990s and becomes more mercantilist -or 'realist'. The article tests seven hypotheses related to two key challenges as perceived by the Commission: building energy markets, and making them work. It finds that the Commission seeks to project the single market beyond its jurisdiction to deal with transit infrastructure problems; extend international regimes to cover energy trade; deal with monopolists such as Gazprom through classical competition policy; and fix global energy market failures with clear regulatory state tools. Importantly, however, some actions by the Commission can be seen as an attempt to counterbalance external actors, or as second-best efforts to address energy market failures.
2006
) and elsewhere (Peters, 2014 , Soetendorp, 1999 , Hill, 1996 , Hill and Smith, 2011 , Bretherton and Vogler, 2006 . The present article does not so much concern the nature of the EU as a global actor, as the external dimension of regulatory state. More specifically, the focus here is on the single market for energy, and the Commission's efforts to ensure security of supply for two goods on which is it heavily import-dependent: oil and gas. Our investigation centres on the Commission's exercise of regulatory policy tools (and not on e.g. the member states' policy decisions about the desired energy mix), and on the Commission's action as a more or less unified regulatory actor. To be sure, the Commission is as divided as any executive or regulator, and often even more so. While the Commission's internal dynamics warrant investigation in their own right, this article concerns how its regulatory state identity at home plays out beyond the borders of the single market.
Energy is a critical case study of the external dimensions of the EU regulatory state. It is a vital public policy issue in a sector that has undergone rapid geopolitical change (Noreng, 2006) .
Both the oil and gas sectors offer a strong test of the EU's will and capacity to extend its liberal regime beyond its borders. Markets for molecules are more difficult to build and manage than markets for shoes, and market failure can have broad implications for industrial production, human welfare and even military security (Yergin, 1991 , Helm, 2002 . If the EU cannot respond to changes in a sector at the heart of economic policy and regulation, it can hardly be expected to address other strategic sectors successfully.
Our point of departure is the observation that recent developments present serious challenges for the EU. Increasingly assertive producer-states, rising resource nationalism and the ascendance of new consumers undermine the market-based liberal model of international energy trade from which the EU benefitted in the early 1990s. China has adopted its own approach to energy, characterised by mercantilism, national champions and off-market deals (Downs, 2005) . Under Putin's leadership Russia has sought to retain state control over strategic sectors such as energy (Gaddy and Ickes, 2009 ). The combination of opaquely governed national oil companies (NOCs) and state-flanked energy deals has contributed to uncertainty regarding supply and demand (Stevens, 2008 , Goldthau, 2010 , Downs, 2005 ).
What's more, the rapid rise in oil prices after the record low of $9/barrel in 1998 to a high of $147 in 2008 (BP, 2011) marked a sharply increased price volatility, and created high adjustment costs for industry, consumers and society. Finally, a series of 'gas disputes' between Russia and transit country Ukraine highlighted Europe's exposure to supply risks stemming from conflict among third parties. As the EU's executive and regulator, the Commission's declared goal therefore is to ensure "secure [...] and affordable energy" for its "people, industry and economy" (European Commission, 2010) , 2).
The EU could meet these challenges by measures that fit well into the liberal paradigm in International Relations theory (centred on open trade), or by way of more security-oriented or protectionist measures. For the purpose of this article, we take 'liberal' to entail an actor interpreting issues primarily in terms of trade rather than geopolitics, and employing policy tools designed to build and maintain open markets. To test this, we elaborate seven hypotheses linked to building international markets and to making them work in practice.
The External Dimension of the EU Regulatory State
The European single market project came to fruition at an extraordinarily favourable moment, with the West ideologically, politically and economically victorious in the cold war. In the energy sector, consumer countries were in the driver seat after the oil price collapse of 1986 and OPEC's decline. By the turn of the millennium these conditions had begun to change, and the EU's open market policy came under considerable stress. Both scholars and policy analysts have therefore called for a stronger, more muscular, and more realist external policy on the part of the EU (Youngs, 2009 , Correlje and van der Linde, 2006 , Smith, 2010 . To assess the Commission's response to the changing energy landscape, seven hypotheses are drawn up based on the presumption that the EU's regulatory nature (and liberal norms) shapes the Commission's strategy for dealing with the external dimension of the single market in energy. This is not to equate the regulatory state with neo-liberalism, since the regulatory state may often amount to a 'rescue of the welfare state' (Levi-Faur, 2011) ; it is simply to assert that the external manifestation of the EU's regulatory state overlaps with liberal or open market approaches to international political economy. Even if EU energy policy does not live up to the regulatory state ideal-type, this approach allows us to elaborate expectations about the Commission's external behaviour qua regulatory state.
To be sure, the EU regulatory state never quite lived up to the ideal-type. There is a welldocumented gap between the ideal-type and energy policy as actually applied in the EU and across its member states Sitter, 2009, Pelkmans, 2001) . A case in point: the 1998 directive liberalising EU gas markets featured limited and gradual market opening, including for example derogations over take-or-pay contracts upon decisions by states (European Parliament and the Council, 1998) . The second and third 'packages' in 2003 (requiring that states adopt a regulated access tariff, establish independent regulators, and ensure non-discriminatory third party access through legal unbundling of transport from trading services (European Parliament and the Council, 2003) measures shall not affect a Member State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply." (European Communities, 2007) , Art. 194(2) ).
Indeed, even the most prominent advocates of the regulatory state thesis (Majone, 1996 , Majone, 2005 argued that although it was the central characteristic of the EU, it was not the only one. EU regulation governs the national regulators, and there are considerable gaps between EU policy and the policies actually implemented by national authorities Sitter, 2006, Hayward and Wurzel, 2012) . As Lodge concluded in a cross-country analysis of Europeanisation of the regulatory state: "the impact of 'Europeanisation' remains heavily influenced by domestic politics and policy-making" (Lodge, 2002) , 63). The key theme that runs through this literature and shapes the hypotheses below is the focus is on regulationremedying market failure by regulatory policy tools -at the expense of other tasks such as redistribution or direct provision of public services and other policy tools such as taxing and spending or public ownership (Moran, 2002 , Lodge, 2008 , Levi-Faur, 2004 . The first set of hypotheses about the external dimension of the EU regulatory state are derived from the assumption that its efforts to build open markets at home is also reflected in an effort to project the single market rules beyond its borders. In other words, the Commission sees its mandate not merely as building an open market ('deepening'), but also as extending its geographical reach ('widening'). In the oil and gas sector this could be done by extending the scope of existing trade regimes that do not cover the energy sector; by building new regimes for trade in energy (including such sector-specific issues such as 'up-stream' investment in production and 'mid-stream' transit regimes); and by establishing rules that guarantee nondiscrimination for 'down-stream' (distribution and sales) market actors. The principal causal mechanism at work here is the norms of the EU regulatory state (the Treaty and the Commission's mandate establish open trade as an objective), but it is reinforced by the range of policy tools that are available to the Commission -powerful regulatory tools, but limited financial resources and no power to directly instruct their NOCs, let alone deploy military force.
Although the regulatory state itself is deeply engrained in the EU's institutional "DNA", it was only in the early 1990s that the regulatory state approach could be projected beyond the then twelve member states. The favourable geopolitical context was the collapse of communism and the 'unipolar moment' (Krauthammer, 1990) . The EU seized the opportunity to establish the European Economic Area, embark on Eastern enlargement, and put in place regimes for trade with the 'near abroad'. This was essentially a market-making project: an effort to extend the single market beyond the EU's boundaries. However, the new geopolitical scene proved ephemeral, and the 'liberal moment' had passed by the turn of the millennium. Economic and political power began to shift away from the OECD world, and the 'west' could no longer (unilaterally) set the rules of the game (Ikenberry, 2008) . This leaves three hypotheses to test: I. First, the more the EU expands its external economic policy into the energy sector, the more we expect the Commission to seek to extend rule-based trade regime to energy in order to secure a level playing field. Our empirical investigation focuses on EU efforts to foster international and regional trading regimes, both in terms of membership and in terms of extending their scope to energy.
II. Second, the stronger the EU's foray into addressing energy supply risks, the greater the Commission's use of general regulatory rules rather than ad hoc bilateral arrangements. Our empirical investigation focuses on the Commission's efforts to extend trade regimes to cover third country investment and transit, i.e. issue areas which are crucial to the bloc's long term supply of oil and gas.
III. Third, the more the lopsided market power in international energy relations becomes the focus of the Commission's actions, the stronger its push to maintain a level playing field for energy firms regardless of their national origin, rather than supporting European 'national champions'. Our empirical investigation focuses on the extent to which single market rules affect non-EU firms that operate in Europe, notably with a view to external monopoly gas suppliers such as Gazprom.
Another four hypotheses follow from the assumption that as a liberal regulatory state, the Commission can be expected to address problems related to making markets work in terms of correcting EU-level market failures. In markets such as oil and gas, the challenge consist of ensuring price transparency and public data on supply and demand; establishing mechanisms to deal with supply (gas) or price (oil) shocks; establishing enforceable laws against cartels, firms' abuse of their dominant position and restraints on trade (price fixing or discrimination, restrictions on re-sale); and supporting crucial infrastructure, notably pipelines. Our second set of hypotheses are informed by these four issues -dealing with asymmetric information in energy markets (market data); managing externalities from non-energy events (notably political shocks to supply); addressing market dominance (restoring competition); and promoting the supply of EU-level public goods (infrastructure). The four hypotheses are:
Fourth, the more pronounced bilateral arrangements or off-market deals in international energy affairs, the stronger the EU's efforts to address obstacles related to full and openly accessible market information on oil and gas fundamentals or shift information asymmetry in its own favour. Our empirical investigation explores the Commission's efforts to foster transparency at home and abroad.
V. Fifth, the more exposed EU energy markets are to external economic shocks (stemming from armed conflict or nationalisation or strikes in producer countries), the more the Commission seeks to manage rather than prevent them. Our empirical investigation explores the ways the EU chose to manage the consequences of political and economic shocks that threaten energy security.
VI. Sixth, the more the EU shifts its attention to producer cartels and monopolies, the stronger the Commission's efforts to foster competition on international energy markets (i.e. break up cartels, rather than counterbalance them by establishing consumer monopsonies). Our empirical investigation explores the Commission's actions related to international and regional oil and gas markets.
VII. Seventh, to the extent that transnational energy infrastructure issues are tackled, the Commission addresses them in terms of market imperfections arising from public goods characteristics related to energy infrastructure and transit, rather than resorting to 'pipeline diplomacy'. Our empirical investigation explores the EU's involvement in providing infrastructure, through a range of policy tools that support the establishment and maintenance of pipelines, inter-connectors and energy networks.
The next sections presents the findings of the empirical investigation. 
Building and Operating International Oil and Gas Markets
Our first set of hypotheses relate to the assumption that the Commission seeks to build or extend rule-based markets for energy, even as global power structures shift against the liberal model. The relevant timeline of our investigation therefore covers both the extension of the Single European Market to energy in the 1990s and the effort to extend this beyond the EU's own boundaries, and the more politicised period that followed in the 2000s. Although the line is sometimes blurred, it is clear that the policy tools as actually applied by the Commission are by no means restricted to the 'liberal' toolbox.
[ Table 1 here]
Extending international trade regimes to the energy sector
The principal policy tools by which the Commission pursues a liberal market agenda in external energy affairs are multilateral and bilateral agreements. The most successful example is the 1994 European Economic Area, which extended the Single European Market to the EFTA states, notably oil and gas-rich Norway, making this important supplier country a defacto member state of the internal market. Norway consequently has to dismantle the Gas Negotiation Committee (GFU), its monopoly organisation for coordinating exports of gas between 1986 and 2002 (Austvik, 2001) . Since oil and gas has been left out of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Commission has sought to include energy in the WTO framework and to close energy-related loopholes such as dual-pricing for gas (Behn and Pogoretskyy, 2012) . However, when the WTO was extended to Russia (2012) and Saudi Arabia (2005), energy was not included (Milthorp and Christy, 2011) , 293). The Energy Community Treaty, which includes Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, the Ukraine and Moldova, is a modest success that commits the signatories to rule based energy governance. The Commission has also started negotiations with Russia and Belarus on a legal framework to operate the electricity networks of the Baltic Member States "[i]n line with the agreed roadmap for full implementation of internal market rules" (European Commission, 2012a ). In addition it uses a number of softer policy instruments, including financial support of non-supply related programs in renewable energy and energy efficiency, the establishment of expert groups to discuss technical issues, and a wide range of partnership agreements (Association Agreements, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, SYNERGY agreements).
The overall finding is that the Commission pushes a liberal agenda that represents an external extension of its own regulatory state. To the extent that the EU ventured into regulating the energy sector as part of its external economic policy, it took a strictly rule-based approach. To be fair, this finding is unsurprising. The EU's overall preference for free trade is hard-wired into the organisation through its treaties and fundamental principles as well as member state economic policy preferences (Moravcsik, 1998) . The expansion of EU external economic policy to energy since the early 1990s has therefore been very much shaped by the EU's overall liberal paradigm. Although there are exceptions to the EU's general free-trade disposition, energy is no longer among them.
Building regimes for transit and investment
The EU has taken several steps to address risks related to security of supply, particularly linked to upstream investment and transit. The main policy tools are international agreements pertaining specifically to the oil and gas sector. The Commission has sought to establish stable and predictable legal frameworks and trans-national dispute-resolution mechanisms. This is based on the conviction that both gas and petroleum trade require substantial upstream investment in production capacity and midstream spending on transport infrastructure, which in turn requires a long time-horizon of involved public or private companies.
A case in point is the Energy Charter Treaty of 1991 (Dore and Bauw, 1995, Waelde, 1995) .
Although Russia signed the ECT, it declined to ratify the treaty and stopped the provisional Council to exchange view on future gas trends. The effectiveness of these measures is clearly debatable, given the successive 'gas crises' that neither forum helped to prevent or solve. Still the Commission clearly comes across as a liberal actor, and has consistently made use of general regulatory rules in addressing energy supply risks, although these rules leave some room for manoeuvre when it comes to implementation (see below).
Including external suppliers in single market rules
With regards to challenges arising from external companies, our principal finding is that the Commission extends its standard policy instruments for liberalising the gas sector to non-EU firms. Notwithstanding the member states' room for manoeuvre, the basic principle is that all firms active within the EU have to comply with EU competition rules and energy market regulation. The best example is the end of Norway's GFU. More controversially, this implies that non-EU firms that operate in the EU market are bound by its rules, as the Microsoft cases illustrated (e.g. Case T-201/04). In effect, the Commission's tactic in terms of both liberalising Matteottti-Berkutova and Nartova call a kind of 'conditionality for firms' -it also stipulates that member state authorities that certify transmission operators should ensure that non-EU firms' ownership does not put security of supply at risk, a requirement that does not apply in the case of EU firms (Cottier et al., 2010 
Addressing lack of transparency as a market failure
The Commission has made increasing transparency in international energy markets a key policy objective. Whilst the oil market may be the only truly integrated commodities market on the planet, around half the international crude oil trade still takes place bilaterally through medium and long term contract. Even the part that is subject to spot and futures trading lacks some key characteristics of fully functioning markets. Important producers, such as Saudi Arabia, reveal neither capacity nor reserves; key consumers, such as China, conceal their level of demand. Even the available market data suffers from a lack of accuracy and common standards of measurement (Holscher et al., 2008 , IEA, 2009 Because gas is primarily transported by pipeline, most trade remains regional. For historical reasons the gas trade outside North America is dominated by long-term take-or-pay contracts (the buyer pays even if they do not take the gas) and is therefore bi-lateral, with prices often pegged to oil. The challenge as identified by the Commission lies in disclosing pricing arrangements between external suppliers and individual European countries. This can be interpreted as an effort to curb price discrimination (which has long characterized European gas markets) as well as an attempt to shift information asymmetries into its own favor.
Either way, the Commission's measures are all scored as fully liberal, in terms both of policy tools and their application. Bilateral arrangements and challenges related to non-disclosure by market actors have been consistently addressed by efforts to gather and disseminate openly accessible information.
Managing external shocks
The EU has taken several steps to address potential price or supply risks stemming from nonenergy events. In oil, events such as war (e.g. the Iran-Iraq war), domestic political turmoil in producer countries (e.g. in Nigeria's Niger delta) or industrial disputes (e.g. the 2002 PdVSA strike in Venezuela) can trigger sever price shocks. Here, the EU's policy efforts have centred on buffering oil price shocks by maintaining and managing strategic petroleum stocks, which can be released to counter the effect an external shock. It does this by supporting the IEA's coordination of release of stocks in emergencies. With regards to gas, disputes between a producer and a transit country can have severe repercussions for third party consumers. As case in point is the two-week 2009 crisis between Russia and Ukraine, which interrupted gas supplies to five South-East European countries (and led to reported losses of some $1.5bn for Gazprom). Reacting to that, the EU now requires member states to hold stocks and put in place measures for dealing with disruptions, and it has promoted measures to make supply networks more robust (e.g. Trans-European Energy Networks, interconnectors and reverse pipeline capacity). In all, the Commission's measures are clearly directed at managing externalities and coping with their effects, rather than preventing them from occurring, and is thus fully in line with the regulatory state logic and the notion of liberal policy tools.
Coping with imperfect competition
The Commission has taken on the challenge to tackle powerful producer cartels and monopolies among the EU's external suppliers. In natural gas, these efforts come against the backdrop of market power shifting (back) to Russia and other Eurasian producers in the 2000s, after a decade of a post-communist 'gas bubble' (Stern, 1995) . The Commission attempts to deal with this through to competition law, e.g. the above-cited break-up of the GFU and decisions that oblige firms that supply the EU market to remove 'destination clauses' that restrict a buyer's freedom to re-sell gas anywhere in the EU. It also has launched anti-trust cases against monopoly supplier Gazprom, based on "concerns that Gazprom may be abusing its dominant market position in upstream gas supply markets in Central and Eastern European
Member States" (European Commission, 2012b) , and vetted member states' (or their firms') bilateral deals with main suppliers. In oil markets, imperfect competition is a problem at the global (not the regional) level, and mainly related to OPEC controlling some 43 percent of global oil production, around 60 percent of globally traded oil and 72 percent of proven reserves (BP, 2013) . The Commission's efforts with respect to oil are therefore channelled through the IEA. Overall, therefore, the finding is that the Commission's efforts center on making markets function more efficiently (and managing market risks) rather than counterbalancing lopsided market power of key supplier.
However, there are some important exceptions to the Commission's liberal strategy. Two cases merit attention. First, the Commission has proposed what effectively amounts to a gas buyers' consortium in the shape of the Caspian Development Corporation. While the project has effectively been halted, the implicit aim was to pool EU consumer power vis-à-vis Central
Asian producer states in order to secure large volumes of gas for Europe and diversify sources of supply beyond Russia (IHS CERA, 2010). Second, the Commission has engaged in negotiating Poland's long-term gas contracts with Russia in 2010. The Commission acting as a 'referee' and vetting deals negotiated between its member states and third parties can be regarded as 'liberal', aimed at ensuring compliance with single market rules. It can, however, also be a means to throw consumer weight behind deals with strong third-country suppliers (European Parliament, 2012) . Both examples take the Commission considerably beyond its regulatory state role. Although the Commission's active role in supporting member states' in negotiations with Gazprom/Russia and the Caspian initiative constitute non-liberal responses to a lopsided regional gas market, they can be seen as second-best efforts to address market failures.
Providing and supporting physical infrastructure
With regard to energy infrastructure, the Commission has supported the establishment of pipelines, interconnectors and other transport infrastructure that exhibit public goods characteristics. This is primarily an issue in natural gas, where pipeline multiplicity is a public good inasmuch as it reduces the EU gas market's reliance on a single external supplier -Russia -or a dominant transit route -across the Ukraine. The Commission takes a two-pronged approach to this challenge.
On one hand, it extends its competition-driven model beyond its own borders by liberal measures, in its effort of build markets. The Commission has for instance asked six EU member states to renegotiate their deals on the planned South Stream pipeline bringing gas through the Black Sea to South Eastern Europe. Standard liberal measures to make markets work include the INOGATE technical assistance programme to promote construction of inter-connector infrastructure for the Eurasian gas network, or the multilateral TRACECA agreement, which aims at supporting pipeline infrastructures from and to the Caspian Sea.
One the other hand, the Commission also supports infrastructure projects in order to overcome the public goods aspect of the pipeline problem. This sometimes requires compromising on competition policy. Here, the Commission's tools include both financial support and regulation. Examples include the exemption of the Nord Stream pipeline between Germany and Russia under the Baltic Sea from some single market rules, and for the Nabucco pipeline initiative that was designed to establish a 'Southern Corridor' to Central Asian gas circumventing both Russia and the Ukraine. The EU also made a financial commitment to Nabucco that included a grant for a feasibility study and 200 million Euro from the European Economic Recovery Programme. Moreover, the Commission -notably in the persons of energy commissioner Oettinger and president Barroso -has engaged in direct talks with potential supplier countries in the Caspian region (European Commission, 2011) . Whilst this does not amount to Russian-style energy 'diplomacy' (Stulberg, 2008) , it certainly leaves the 'liberal' paradigm. Still, and although Nabucco eventually lost out to the rivalling Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) pipeline project, these decisions and actions can be seen as efforts to help supply public goods (pipelines). At the same time, they may be interpreted as efforts to support infrastructure projects designed to circumvent dominant external players such as Gazprom/Russia or the Ukraine. Whilst not liberal in outlook, these efforts to 'making markets work' by diversifying supply thus increasing gas-on-gas competition to compensate for the failure to extend single market rules on trade, transit and investment to the former Soviet states.
Conclusion: The Mostly Liberal External Face of the EU Regulatory State
Overall, our main finding is that the Commission -and EU as a whole -has indeed adopted a liberal paradigm, but with plenty of room for ambivalent interpretation. This points toward two broad conclusions. First, in external energy policy, the Commission is -mostly -a liberal actor, even as the world of energy turns more realist. Second, it is so by choice. Although the institutions and policy tools of the regulatory state constrain the Commission's external action, its toolbox contains more than simply regulatory tools. When it comes to how to build markets for energy and extend their geographical reach, the Commission's strategy (and indeed the strategy of the EU as a whole) is overwhelmingly liberal. Its overall aim is the establishment of rule-based open market energy trade, rather than ad hoc-bilateral arrangements. When it comes to making markets work, the findings are more diverse. When addressing asymmetric information and managing the consequences of external shocks to price or supply, the liberal toolbox suffices. However, when it comes to pipeline politics and coping with Gazprom's dominant supply role, regulatory policy tools are supplemented by diplomacy, finance and ad
hoc exemptions to open market rules. We argue that this represents a pragmatic solution to the dilemma the EU faces in an increasingly 'realist' international context: if it is not possible to extend the regulatory state, it might be necessary to compromise on some of its principles abroad in order to maintain the regulatory-market model at home. The conclusion that the EU is a liberal actor in a realist world therefore merits the adjective mostly. This adjective is of considerable significance. The fundamental challenge for the Commission is that the EU is increasingly caught between its liberal market model and a world less and less inclined to stick to this model. The EU's response has been to stick to its liberal guns -by choice and with conviction -even if this no longer fully resonates in the new environment, but to explore pragmatic use of a wider range of policy tools. Its use of non-liberal tools represent a secondbest strategy; an effort to work around problems when its primary strategy fails.
